For years, the UK and US have approached whistleblowing from slightly different starting points. The UK’s regime has primarily focused on preventing those who speak up from being subject to any detriment for having done so. The US has gone a step further, using financial incentives to encourage whistleblowers to bring information directly to regulators. The US has been something of a trailblazer in this regard, with only a small number of other jurisdictions (e.g. Canada/South Korea) adopting financial incentive models. Most global systems remain protection-based, rather than incentive-based, though the “tone” of the UK legislation has historically been more that whistleblowers are a necessary nuisance to be tolerated rather than a force for good to be encouraged.
Over the course of the last decade or so, UK policymakers and regulators have periodically considered but largely resisted US-style bounty schemes. As far back as 2014, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) issued a note on “Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers“, examining the proposition but ultimately rejecting it.
The UK government’s latest consultation, however, suggests policymakers may be taking a fresh look at the enforcement benefits that incentives are said to deliver as part of a wider package of proposed reforms (or, viewed more cynically, may have finally succumbed to the partial, but alluring prospect of more intelligence, more enforcement actions and ultimately more money being recovered, all while persuading whistleblowers to do much of the detective work themselves).
Alongside a broader review of whistleblower protections, the consultation seeks views on a proposal to introduce financial rewards for whistleblowers. Importantly, the proposal is expressly confined to individuals who report economic crime to the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), rather than applying across the whistleblowing landscape more generally. That is perhaps unsurprising given the potentially vast sums at stake and the difficulty of detecting this type of misconduct without insider information. As noted in Jonathan Fisher KC’s Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences, fraud and money laundering are estimated to cost the UK economy hundreds of billions of pounds each year. It is to be hoped that this proposal does not morph into any wider initiative to reward whistleblowers on matters without a direct cash value, for example, in relation to alleged health and safety breaches, since that would truly open the floodgates. However, it requires little imagination to think that employees and others may attempt to argue that errors on their pay packets and tax deductions represent attempted financial crimes with a clear cash value, so it is to be hoped that there will be some “de minimis” cut off somewhere. If not, the SFO may suddenly find itself significantly under-staffed.
Viewed through that lens, this element of the wider whistleblowing proposals feels less like a conventional employment law reform and more like a “bolt on” strategy for improving the detection and prosecution of serious economic crime. Indeed, the government does not propose linking entitlement to a reward to the requirements for making a protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996, meaning that the pool of those who could potentially report is larger. Individuals would not need to be workers in order to qualify, and separate eligibility criteria would apply addressing matters such as whether a person was already under a legal duty to report the relevant information (hard luck, Compliance Officers) or had some culpable involvement in the underlying misconduct.
The consultation notes that the proposal follows recommendations made by Jonathan Fisher in Part 2 of his Independent Review and aligns with the SFO’s Strategy 24-29 commitment to explore whistleblower incentives. Fisher’s review argues that many of the concerns previously raised by the FCA, including malicious reporting, witness credibility and public confidence, can be addressed through careful design and appropriate safeguards. It also questions whether financial rewards are quite as “un-British” as has often been suggested, citing Ipsos polling showing that 70% of British adults in fact support rewarding whistleblowers who expose serious economic crime. It seems that the admirable notion that whistleblowing should be its own reward becomes rather less compelling when cold, hard cash is on the table, even for the Brits. Given the number of Employment Tribunal claimants who seek to shoehorn some purported protected disclosure into their claim for the extra cash or leverage it might bring, perhaps this should be no surprise.
In terms of success, certainly, the numbers from across the pond are compelling. A number of US regulators operate direct reporting channels and financial reward schemes for whistleblowers. One of the most prominent is the SEC’s whistleblower programme, which has reportedly paid a total of almost $2 billion to nearly 400 whistleblowers. In financial year 2025 alone, the SEC awarded more than $60 million to 48 individuals. Given that whistleblowers typically receive only a percentage of the sanctions recovered, those award figures tell only part of the story. Perhaps this is the reason why there is no question in the new consultation asking if the scheme itself should proceed. Instead, respondents are largely being asked how it should operate.
In accordance with the government’s proposals, presumably in an attempt to introduce the safeguards Fisher referred to, any reward would only be payable where information provided by a whistleblower is both significant and original and leads to a successful enforcement outcome. The consultation also seeks views on who should determine eligibility and award levels, how appeals should operate and whether the SFO should publish annual reports on the operation of the scheme.
As recommended by Fisher, the consultation also seeks views on whether a new criminal offence should be introduced for individuals who knowingly make false reports under the scheme. In addition, it explores whether specific protections should be introduced for individuals who experience harassment or intimidation after reporting information to the SFO, particularly where they would not otherwise benefit from the protections against detriment available under the ERA 1996.
What should employers be doing now?
Many of the consultation proposals remain at an early stage and may ultimately change. However, if financial incentives are introduced, organisations may find themselves competing with regulators for information about potential misconduct.
Historically, employers have relied on legal protections, internal reporting arrangements and organisational culture to encourage concerns to be raised internally. Direct and material financial incentives for external reporting could place those mechanisms under greater strain.
Employers may therefore wish to ask themselves several uncomfortable questions:
- Do employees genuinely trust internal reporting channels?
- Do employees believe concerns will be investigated fairly and objectively?
- Are managers equipped to respond appropriately when concerns are raised?
- Is there a perception, justified or otherwise, that speaking up carries career risk?
- Would an employee with evidence of serious wrongdoing be more likely to report internally or externally?
- Do we know what our rights are if the SFO comes calling, with or without knocking?
For many organisations, the principal risk will not be the existence of a reward scheme itself. The real risk is that a financial incentive may expose weaknesses in workplace culture that already exist.
Ultimately, organisations with strong speak-up cultures may have less to fear from whistleblower incentives. Employees who trust their employer, believe concerns will be investigated properly and feel protected from retaliation will be more likely to continue to raise issues internally. In that sense, the consultation is not just a debate about whistleblower bounties. It is also a reminder that culture remains one of the most important controls against corporate misconduct. However, the reality is surely that if reporting internally brings me a nice warm feeling of having done the Right Thing for my employer while reporting externally brings me a five or six figure sum, workplace culture might not get much of a look-in.
