Minnesota Judge Denies Injunction Against Soon-To-Be Effective Persuader Rule but Notes Potential Issues with Rule

We kicked off the week by reminding you the Department of Labor’s (DOL) new “persuader” rules are set to take effect July 1.  The DOL’s new rules expand the circumstances under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”) in which employers, labor consultants, and law firms must report fees and expenses associated with activity aimed at persuading employees against unionizing.  Most notably, the rules expand the definition of persuader activities to include a number of indirect activities, such as holding educational seminars for employers, developing personnel policies, and drafting or editing materials distributed to employees.

On Wednesday, a Minnesota federal judge refused to issue a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of the persuader rule in response to a lawsuit and application for injunction filed by an association of law firms and groups representing management in labor and employment matters. U.S. District Judge Patrick J. Schiltz declined to issue the injunction on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to show they will suffer irreparable harm without one.  However, all was not lost for employers and groups seeking to challenge the persuader rule.  The silver lining is that the Court noted plaintiffs are likely to eventually “succeed in their claim that portions of the new rule conflict with the LMRDA.”  Providing a lengthy analysis of the merits of the action, the Court explained “the root of the DOL’s problem is in its insistence that persuader activity and advice are mutually exclusive categories.”

The case is Labnet Inc., et al. v. U.S. Department of Labor, et al., case no. 0:16‑cv00844, in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Two other similar challenges have been brought in District Courts in Texas and Arkansas.  The Texas case in particular points to violations of employers’ constitutional rights and potential harm to attorney‑client confidentiality.

Employers, labor consultants, and law firms should monitor these developments, but should nevertheless continue to prepare to adapt to the new rules.

BREAKING: Chicago Catches Sick Leave Fever

Today (June 22, 2016), Chicago’s City Council passed an ordinance requiring employers to provide paid sick leave to employees beginning on July 1, 2017.  Mayor Emanuel spoke in favor of the ordinance following the Council’s vote, noting his “fervent wish” that the state of Illinois would follow suit and pass a statewide paid sick leave law. Chicago joins Minneapolis, Los Angeles and San Diego as the most recent cities to pass paid sick leave laws.

Chicago’s ordinance is, in many respects, similar to paid sick leave laws in other jurisdictions, but it has a few key differences and a few ambiguities, detailed below. In order to be eligible for paid sick leave under Chicago’s law, an employee must work for an employer for at least 80 hours in any 120-day period.  Employees will accrue one hour of paid sick leave for every 40 hours worked, up to a maximum of 40 hours per 12‑month period (calculated from when the employee first became eligible to accrue paid sick leave (e.g., January 1, 2017 or upon hire)).  All employees may carry over half of any unused, accrued paid sick leave hours to the next year, up to a maximum of 20 hours.

Chicago’s ordinance is unique in that it allows employees to carry over additional sick leave from one year to the next, to be used for absences that are eligible under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  The law provides that if the employee is FMLA-eligible, the employee may carry over an additional 40 hours of accrued, unused paid sick leave to the next year.  This is where things get murky.  The law states that employees may only use 40 hours of paid sick leave per year.  However, if an employee “carries over 40 hours of Family and Medical Leave Act leave … and uses that leave, he or she is entitled to use no more than an additional 20 hours of accrued Paid Sick Leave in the same 12‑month period….”  As written, the ordinance technically could be read to require an employee to carry over a full 40 hours of FMLA sick leave and use all of that leave before the employee could use sick leave for any other purpose during that 12‑month period.  Surely, that is not the intent, but the way the ordinance is currently drafted certainly creates confusion as to whether an employee who has carried over FMLA sick leave is required to use up all of that leave before taking sick leave for any other (non-FMLA eligible) purpose.  Hopefully, the City will realize this, make revisions or provide guidance clarifying the matter for employers before the ordinance goes into effect.

As in most other jurisdictions, employees may use paid sick leave for: the employee’s or the employee’s family member’s illness or injury, or to receive medical care, treatment, diagnosis or preventive medical care; for absences resulting from the employee or the employee’s family member’s status as a victim of domestic violence or a sex offense; or if the employee’s place of business or child’s school is closed due to a public health emergency.  Notably, Chicago’s law has an expansive definition for family member, extending it to include any individual related to the employee by blood, or whose close association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship.

Employers should also be aware that the Chicago law requires that they provide notice of covered employee’s rights to paid sick leave with the first paycheck issued after the law goes into effect on January 1, 2017 (or the first paycheck after hire, for employees hired after that date).  The City will be providing a form notice that employers can use for this purpose.

DTSA Requires Employers to Provide Notice of Immunity to Putative Whistleblowers

As a follow up to our previous blogpost, a new federal law, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), which went into place on May 11, provides a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.

One important employment law aspect of the DTSA that has not received a lot of attention is the requirement that employers provide notice of the immunity provided by the DTSA to putative whistleblowers. Such notice should appear in employee confidentiality agreements and the like. Failure to provide the notice will result in the employer’s inability to recover exemplary damages or attorneys’ fees against an employee who violates the DTSA and whose confidentiality agreement lacked the disclosure. The notice provision does not require the revision of agreements in existence prior to May 11. Rather, it applies to any such agreements amended or new agreements made on or after May 11, 2016.

If you have not done so recently, we recommend attorney review of your company’s employment and/or confidentiality agreements for compliance with the DTSA along with other local, state and federal laws.

Please contact us if you would like more information. Our Labor & Employment and Intellectual Property and Technology Groups held a special webinar on important topics regarding the DTSA on Thursday, June 9. The presentation materials from this webinar can be accessed here.

Missing you already – Justice Committee torpedoes no-show Government review on Employment Tribunal fees

Those few of our readers who are inexplicably not committed followers of the House of Commons Justice Committee have missed a little cracker this week with the issue of its report on Court and Tribunal fees.

As everyone in the business knows, the introduction of fees in 2013 knocked the bottom out of Employment Tribunal case numbers, overall by some 70% in the following two years, and in relation to some categories of claim by as much as 78% (working time cases).

Following a series of judicial challenges, the Government found it politic to agree to undertake a review on whether fees had prejudiced access to justice, and/or had reduced the number of weak cases and/or had led would-be litigants to seek alternative (okay, cheaper) methods of dispute resolution.

Twelve months after it was started, and a full six months after its ETA, that review remains unpublished, even though the near-vertical drop in claim numbers can have little other tenable explanation. The Ministry of Justice has repeatedly failed to indicate when its review will appear, and there are some gratifyingly scathing comments in the Justice Committee report: “It is difficult to see how a Minister can urge his officials to progress a review which they apparently submitted to him four months previously“.  One imagines some tense moments in the House of Commons bar over the coming weeks.

It is equally hard to avoid the conclusion that the Government’s review has found exactly what everybody told it at the time, i.e. that fees were too high, that people determined to bring vexatious claims would not be fussed about them anyway, and that the remission scheme was so complex and painful in its application that people would sooner just walk away, broken, rather like trying to get a delayed train refund out of Thameslink. There is also one particularly distasteful little nugget I had not previously known – your assets as assessed for remission scheme purposes will include any redundancy pay or pay in lieu of notice you have just received from your dismissal.  Therefore, the mere fact of your dismissal can often make you ineligible for the fee waiver necessary for you to challenge it.

The Justice Committee (does that name sound as if they meet by candlelight, faces hidden in the shadows of their black pointy hoods, and each carrying a scythe, or what?) accepts at the outset that “some degree of financial risk is an important discipline for those contemplating legal action, and a contribution by users of the Courts to the costs of operating [them] is not objectionable in principle“.  However, the Committee was clear in its own findings – describing the Government’s evidence to it as “even on the most favourable construction, superficial“, it concluded that ET fees have had no material impact on the number of vexatious or frivolous cases, and that access to justice for those who needed it most has indeed been significantly prejudiced by the level of the fee charged.

So what next on the ET fee front? If we go for a Brexit this week, then this question will be the least of the Government’s worries.  If we do not, then for a time at least, no one will care anyway.  The prospect of change in the near future, therefore, seems pretty minimal.

The Justice Committee tentatively floats some tinkering with case categories, relaxation of the remission thresholds, and a basic fee of £50. Whether the additional claim numbers which might be expected as a result of that reduction would be sufficient compensation to the Treasury for the smaller fee is unclear, but the Committee was very clear on the point – “if there were to be a binary choice between income from fees and preservation of access to justice, the latter must prevail“.  Brave words indeed, but nothing the Government has not been quite happily ignoring for a number of years.

DOL’s New Persuader Rules Take Effect Soon – Are You Ready?

Starting July 1, law firms doing labor and employment work could be required to disclose information about all of their labor and employment clients unless the firm has agreements in place prior to July 1 with those clients regarding “persuader” activity.

The U.S. Department of Labor released new rules in March expanding the circumstances in which employers and their consultants may be bound by reporting requirements under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. These “persuader” rules require that employers, lawyers and consultants report to the DOL the fee arrangement and expenditures associated with it for any activity that was aimed directly at persuading employees regarding unionization. Specifically, any work that (1) had a goal of persuading employees regarding unionization or (2) supplied the employer with information about employee or union activities in connection with a labor dispute. Under the version of the rule that has been in effect for more than 50 years, “advice” to an employer was not reportable activity, exempting most attorney-client relationships from the reporting requirements.

The new rules define “advice” narrowly and expand the definition of persuader activities from direct employee persuasion to include indirect persuasion, such as directing or coordinating supervisors; drafting editing or choosing materials to distribute to employees regarding unionization; holding seminars for employers that discuss persuasion strategies; and developing personnel policies in the context of organized activity or with persuasive intent.

Under the DOL’s new rule, reports would have to include fee arrangements and expenditures for “all advice and services on matters having a bearing on the relations between an employer and his employees,” for any client a law firm represents in the labor and employment realm. That means if a law firm does persuader work for any client, the firm will have to report its fee arrangements and billing for clients for whom they do reportable work and any other clients for whom they do other labor and employment work. Those reports could include charges for work on harassment investigations, discrimination claims and other issues that do not touch on collective bargaining.

The law imposes criminal penalties and personal liability on individuals, both at the employer company and in the consulting firm, who knowingly fail to make the required disclosures.

Agreements established before July 1, 2016 will still fall under the old rule, and law firms are rushing to get clients to sign such agreements before the new rules take effect. Employers should reach out to their legal counsel, if they have not discussed this issue already, to determine (1) whether counsel does any reportable work for the employer, (2) whether counsel does any reportable work for any other employers and (3) whether the employer is comfortable with counsel’s duty to report based on the answers to the first two questions.

Calling All Entrepreneurs – Australia Wants You!

The election promises of Australia’s two major political parties may have few synergies, but one thing they both agree on is that Australia must do more to attract entrepreneurial talent to its shores.

To this end, both parties have pledged to introduce a new entrepreneur visa if elected.  Information about the criteria of each of the proposed visas is limited, but here is a summary of what we know so far:

Liberal Party of Australia Australian Labour Party
  • Visa will form part of the existing Business, Innovation and Investment (subclass 188, 888) visa.
  • Available to emerging entrepreneurs with innovative ideas.
  • Will require financial backing from approved third party investors.
  • Business, Innovation and Investment visas are currently valid for an initial period of 4 years and 3 months.
  • Provides a pathway to permanent residency.
  • Will be introduced in the second half of 2016.
  • 2000 visas will be available annually.
  • Will require proven access to capital (circa AU$200,000) to invest in a start-up business or less if venture capital funding is obtained.
  • Will be valid for an initial period of 3 years.
  • Provides a pathway to permanent residency after 2 years.

Both parties have also stated their intention to introduce a new visa pathway for graduates who, in the case of the Liberal Party, have obtained a specialised doctorate or masters by research qualifications in science, technology, engineering or maths at Australian universities or, in the case of the Labour Party, for those graduates who have credible and genuine start-up ideas and the support of a higher education institution.

Mean manager mistreats minion – employer left to pay the cost

A recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (QCA) has set the record straight in finding that an aged care provider was vicariously liable for the belittling and aggressive conduct of its manager, and awarding the worker $435,583.98 in damages for a psychiatric injury.

Ms Eaton started work as an administrative assistant for an aged care provider in June 2007.

Fellow workers recall Ms Eaton being a ‘bright and bubbly’ colleague until a new manager joined the team in 2009, following which she was often seen holding back tears with trembling hands.

In March 2010, following an incident where her manager screamed at her for taking a message for a patient, Ms Eaton tendered her resignation. A few months later, Ms Eaton attempted to return to work as an administrative assistant at a hospital but found after one day that she was unable to do so due to an ongoing depression and anxiety.

Subsequently, Ms Eaton lodged a claim in the Brisbane District Court (DC) against the aged care provider for damages of $587,869 on the basis that the aged care provider was vicariously liable for the manager’s bullying conduct, was negligent in failing to implement control measures to prevent the manager from bullying her, and failed to address her complaints of stress.

At first instance, the DC Judge Devereaux found that the manager was belligerent, offensive and intimidating, consistently belittled and yelled at her in front of others, and told her she had ‘never met anybody so stupid as you’. However, with respect to her claim for damages, Judge Devereaux found that the aged care provider was not vicariously liable because her injury was not reasonably foreseeable.

On appeal, the QCA overturned the decision at first instance finding that the employer breached its duty of care to the worker in failing to realise, despite evident deterioration, that ‘there was more than a far-fetched or fanciful risk that [she] would suffer a psychiatric illness without the exercise of reasonable care by her employer to avoid or minimise her stressful experiences in the workplace’.

In doing so, the QCA referred to the High Court’s position in Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd [2005] HCA 15 that ‘the relevant duty of care is engaged if psychiatric injury to the particular employee is reasonably foreseeable’.

Accordingly, the aged care provider was ordered to pay Ms Eaton $435,583 in damages for future loss of earnings.

This case serves as a timely reminder that employers have a legal responsibility to take reasonable care to avoid a risk of a psychiatric injury to an employee who is exhibiting a particular vulnerability. As such, it is vitally important that employers treat any suspected or alleged bullying seriously, to ensure they’re not expose to a hefty claim down the track.

Full of promise – employer comes unstuck in discretionary bonus scheme

Here is a recent case which contains lessons harder than A-Level Maths for employers with discretionary bonus schemes.

Mr Hills was regional sales manager in the UK for Niksun Inc, a US-owned business whose website says that it is “the primary provider of full packet capture for DISA“.  No, nor me.  Niksun runs a bonus scheme based on attributable sales revenues.  While it stresses repeatedly that revenue allocations are discretionary, it also states that they will be “fair and reasonable” and that for any given sale, the allocation will take into account point of influence (where the major account control resides), point of sale (where purchase orders are received) and point of installation (where the delivered product is physically sited).  Each is allocated up to a third of the available revenue, but all still subject to repeated references to an overriding discretion residing with senior management in the US.

Mr Hills closed a sale in the UK for an installation in Asia Pacific. He had been told by his boss, who had in turn been told by someone senior in the US, that if the deal were done, he would be “looked after” in relation to the revenues coming off it.  He was correspondingly more than slightly disgruntled when credited with less than half (48%) of those fees.

But the scheme was discretionary, it said repeatedly, and everyone knows that so long as a discretionary bonus award is not perverse or irrational, it cannot be challenged. The UK was clearly not the point of installation, so that was a third of the revenues gone elsewhere straight off.  In addition, employees in the US had undoubtedly contributed to some extent to the account management, so that suggested that Mr Hills should not get all the remainder.  In the circumstances it would surely be impossible for him to show that a 48% allocation was irrational or perverse?

Perhaps so in normal circumstances, but the Winchester County Court Judge (now backed in full by the Court of Appeal) took the view that these were not normal circumstances. And therein lie the lessons for employers, since the points which the Judge relied on in awarding Mr Hills a sum equivalent to an allocation of two thirds of the contract revenues (an extra £6,700) are in fact present in many bonus schemes and bonus discussions:

Lessons for employers:

  • The very high “perverse or irrational” hurdle for a successful challenge to a discretionary bonus award only applies where the discretion is completely unfettered.
  • So as soon as you start qualifying it in any way, you are bound also by those qualifications. Here there were three main caveats to the broad discretion which Niksun thought it had:
  • The statement that the bonus would be “fair and reasonable“. This sounds like a modest enough aspiration, but is still a much narrower band than that which is merely not irrational or perverse, a phrase which can easily allow for decisions which are unfair, harsh, ignorant or unreasonable.
  • The assessment of revenue allocation by the three points (influence, sale, installation). The Judge found as a fact that the UK, not the US, was the main point of influence.  This necessarily suggested a higher figure for Mr Hills than a calculation based on its being the US.
  • Most dangerously for employers, the assurance to Mr Hills’ boss that the UK would be “looked after” in the revenue allocation. Which employer has never said anything of this sort to an employee with itchy feet?  However, even a phrase as vague and non-committal as that was still found to have a weighting effect in the proper exercise of Niksun’s discretion.
  • It would be easy to conclude that the Judge reached his conclusions because Niksun did not call as witness the US boss responsible for the bonus allocation. His evidence as to the thinking behind the bonus decision would have gone a long way on Niksun’s behalf.  However, the Judge was no fan of Mr Hill either – “Mr Hills was so strongly motivated to maximise his claim that he had been willing to behave in a dishonourable way and was a witness whose evidence should be treated with caution”.  Mr Hills was therefore in the faintly depressing position of not being fully believed even though the other side effectively did not turn up, but he succeeded all the same.
  • So think carefully where you want to put the line between law and good practice for your bonus scheme. Give your employees no insight into how it will be assessed, no assurance that it will be fair and no promise that good work will be rewarded, and you will have very substantial freedom of manoeuvre.  However, if you want your staff to be committed, incentivised and perhaps less likely to make the sort of comments about you which appear on Niksun’s Glassdoor review, there may be a price attached.

Sick of These Updates Yet? The Latest Sick Leave and Minimum Wage News (Minneapolis, San Francisco, San Diego, OR)

Minneapolis is the first city in the Midwest to jump on the sick leave bandwagon. On May 27, the Minneapolis City Council passed a sick and safe time ordinance that requires employers of employees working in Minneapolis to provide sick leave to those employees. Beginning July 1, 2017, employers of 1-5 employees must provide unpaid sick leave, while employers of 6 or more employees must provide paid sick leave. The law specifies that all employees working for an employer (not just those working in Minneapolis) should be counted in determining employer size (although this provision seems to conflict with the how the law defines “employee”). However, only employees who perform work within the city for at least 80 hours a year for an employer are entitled to accrue sick leave.

Beginning on July 1, 2017 or upon commencement of employment, employees will accrue one hour of sick leave for every 30 hours worked, up to 48 hours (2 days) of sick leave each year. Employees may carryover all accrued, unused sick leave hours to the next year, but there is an 80 hour cap on the amount of sick leave an employee may have at one time. The law does not specify what happens if an employee hits that cap before accruing 48 hours of leave; ostensibly the employee would begin accruing again after using some of the accrued sick leave.

Employees can use sick leave for the usual sick and safe leave reasons; sick leave may be used in four hour increments. As with other sick leave laws, the law also specifies under what circumstances employers can require notice and documentation of sick leave use, and also specifies the recordkeeping requirements. The law requires employers to post a required notice (not yet published) and, if they have an employee handbook, to include in the handbook the notice of rights and remedies provided for under the law.

Importantly for employers with existing PTO policies, the City Council has recognized that many employers have existing PTO policies that do not require accrual and do not allow for carryover and has directed various city offices to analyze how such policies can be accounted for in the law by August 17, 2016.

The city will likely publish some guidance clarifying some of the ambiguities in the law sometime before next July.  In the meantime, if you have employees in Minneapolis, get those employee handbooks and sick leave accrual and use tracking mechanisms ready!

Voters in San Francisco voted yesterday (June 7, 2016) to amend that city’s paid sick leave law, the oldest in the nation. The amendments, which go into effect on January 1, 2017, expand San Francisco’s paid sick leave law to parallel the broader provisions of California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act. Specifically, Proposition E amends San Francisco’s paid sick leave law as follows:

  • Provides that employees would begin to accrue paid sick leave on the first day of employment (rather than the 90th day of employment) but may not use sick leave until the 90th day of employment.
  • Provides that employees who leave their job and are rehired by the same employer within a year would have their unused sick leave reinstated.
  • Provides that employees can use paid sick leave for leave or other purposes when the employee is a victim or domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking.
  • Provides that employees can use paid sick leave for purposes related to organ or bone marrow donation.
  • Broadens the definition of family member.
  • Provides that an employer may provide a lump sum of paid sick leave at the beginning of the year, which would be treated as an advance. An employee would not accrue paid sick leave until after the employee has worked the number of hours necessary to have accrued the upfront allocation amount.
  • Provides that employers who have to provide notice of available sick leave under California state law must also include on that notice the amount of paid sick leave available under San Francisco’s law.

Proposition E also grants the Board of Supervisors the power to amend the paid sick leave law to adopt provisions to parallel state or federal law in order to provide broader protections or coverage for employees (thus avoiding the need to put any such changes before voters again).

Also in yesterday’s elections in California, San Diego voters passed Proposition I, approving Ordinance O-20390, which provides for paid sick and safe leave and a minimum wage hike. Of note, the law is effective as soon as the election results are certified. The sick leave portion of the law was originally set to go into effect (and provides for sick leave to begin accruing) in 2015. However, interest groups forced the referendum. One would hope the city would provide employers with a grace period, but barring that employers should start tracking and allowing use of sick leave almost immediately.

Under the sick leave portion of the law, employees who perform at least two hours of work in San Diego in a year will be entitled to one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked. Unlike most other jurisdictions, there is no cap on accrual of paid sick leave, however employees are limited to using only 40 hours of paid sick leave per year.  Accrued, unused sick leave must carry over from year to year. Sick leave may be used in two hour increments. Unused sick leave does not have to be paid out upon termination of employment.

Also under this law, San Diego’s new minimum wage is $10.50, increasing to $11.50 per hour on January 1, 2017. Beginning in 2019, it will be tied to inflation. Given California’s recent minimum wage hike, the San Diego rate will match the state rate beginning in 2019.

Meanwhile, in Oregon, nine counties have sued the state over its sick leave law, which went into effect in January. Employers shouldn’t get excited, however—the counties are only challenging the legality of the law as it applies to them. Specifically, the counties claim that the sick leave law is an unfunded government mandate, and are asking the court for an interpretation of a 1996 amendment to the state’s constitution, which requires the legislature to pay local governments for costs of new state-mandated programs and provides that if funds are not provided, the local government does not have to comply with the program. While the lawsuit will not impact private employers, it is a good reminder for employers with employees working in Oregon to ensure that they are in compliance with Oregon’s sick leave law, which has a few unusual provisions, such as allowing the use of sick leave for bereavement purposes.

Finally, employers should ensure they are ready for the next round of minimum wage hikes, which go into effect July 1. You can find the current minimum wage rates in this chart, which is current as of May 26, 2016.

EEOC to Issue Comprehensive Guidance on National Origin Discrimination – Opens Comment Period to the Public

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) has proposed comprehensive enforcement guidance addressing national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC announced this past Thursday that it is seeking public comments prior to issuing its final enforcement guidance. Enforcement guidance documents from the EEOC state the agency’s official policy on how relevant laws and regulations should apply to specific workplace situations.

This announcement comes 14 years after the EEOC last comprehensively addressed the issue of national origin discrimination. Since that time, there have been significant legal developments addressing national origin discrimination that are covered by the EEOC’s new proposed guidance. Specifically, the revised guidance addresses job segregation, human trafficking, and intersectional discrimination. A current copy of the proposed revised guidance can be found here.

In fiscal year 2015, the EEOC reports 11 percent of the private sector charges filed with the EEOC included allegations of national origin discrimination. “The EEOC has identified protecting immigrant, migrant, and other vulnerable populations as a national strategic priority” according to EEOC Chair Jenny Yang. The EEOC is currently involved in a lawsuit it brought against Wisconsin Plastics, Inc. back in 2012 alleging the termination of a group of workers was due to national origin discrimination. The case is EEOC v. Wisconsin Plastics, Inc., case number 1:14-cv-00663, and is pending before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

The 30-day comment period begins on July 1, 2016. The EEOC will consider all input prior to implementing its final enforcement guidance. Input may be provided by mailing hard copies to the EEOC[1], or may be provided electronically in letter, email, or memoranda format by using www.regulations.gov. Comments will be posted publicly on the website and may show email addresses. Therefore, commenters should be careful not to include personal information that should not be made publically available.

[1] Mail should be directed to Public Input, EEOC, Executive officer, 131 M Street, N.E., Washington D.C. 20507.

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